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Post-quantum

Why quantum computers threaten today's cryptocurrencies, and how NumFranc protects itself.

The threat

The signatures used today by Bitcoin, Ethereum and most websites (elliptic curves, RSA) rely on mathematical problems that an ordinary computer would need billions of years to solve. A powerful enough quantum computer could solve them in hours using Shor's algorithm (1994). None exists yet, but experts advise preparing now, because changing signatures in a worldwide system takes years.

The answer: new standards

In August 2024, the US standards agency (NIST) published three standards designed to resist quantum computers:

FIPS 203 — ML-KEMagreeing on a secret key (lattices)
FIPS 204 — ML-DSAdigital signatures (lattices)
FIPS 205 — SLH-DSAsignatures built only from hash functions

In France, ANSSI recommends not betting everything on one mathematical family, and considers SLH-DSA a conservative choice.

What NumFranc does

ML-DSA-87 for every payment

The highest level of the standard (level 5), from the very first block: no migration needed.

SLH-DSA for every release

Software releases are signed with another, hash-based mathematical family.

SHA3-512 everywhere

512-bit fingerprints keep about 256 bits of security even against a quantum computer (Grover's algorithm).

Wallet encrypted twice

AES-256 then XChaCha20, with two independent 256-bit keys derived by Argon2id.

The trade-off

Post-quantum signatures are larger (about 4.6 KB for ML-DSA-87, versus 64 bytes for Bitcoin). NumFranc transactions are therefore heavier: a deliberate choice for long-term security.

NumFranc aims to become a leading post-quantum payment infrastructure, used by individuals and businesses alike. Open-source software under development: no NFR for sale, no promise of value.